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NORTH CAROLINA'S REAL ESTATE
RECORDING LAWS: THE GHOST OF 1885
CHARLES SZYPSZAK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Private real estate ownership depends on reliable public records.
Conveyance laws provide those who acquire real estate interests with
a way to record their rights to protect themselves against competing
conveyances of the same interests. Purchasers and lenders rely on
these records to assess the likelihood that those with whom they are
dealing own real estate free of competing claims.
North Carolina is one of the very few states clinging to a "pure
race" recording system, which is characterized simply as "first to re-
cord, first in right." Unlike the recording statutes common elsewhere,
North Carolina's laws are intended to limit the inquiry of real estate
interests to the public record, by eliminating the need to consider
other information that may be available about a competing claim.
This intended purity has proved to be an illusion. The real estate
records give an incomplete picture of property rights. Courts have
used their equitable powers to reorder the priority of rights that the
records depict. Lawmakers have created liens that can apply without
having to appear in the real estate records. Courts have denied the
recording benefits to instruments deemed to have been prepared im-
properly. In a fairly recent development, the records have been used
as a tool for harming rather than protecting property interests. These
realities make the recording laws far less simple than they may ap-
pear, and raise questions about whether the statutes could be a more
comprehensive and coherent statement of the rules.
This article discusses the nature of the race recording statute and
the major conceptual and practical issues that have arisen in its appli-
cation. Part II discusses the statute and the extent to which it truly
results in a pure record as originally envisioned. It also considers how
the statute could be amended to reflect the law as it is actually ap-
plied. Part III describes undue risks to legitimate conveyances posed
by requiring strict compliance with recording rules, and examines pos-
sible refinements to the laws to address these risks. Part IV describes
* Associate Professor of Public Law and Government, School of Government, The Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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abuse of the recording system and possible legislative responses to the
problem.
II. THE MISLEADING NOTION OF PURE REAL ESTATE RECORDS
In the United States, real estate conveyances are governed by state
law. All states have recording offices for real estate instruments and
laws that govern the effect of recording, including how disputes are
resolved if there is a conflict between the sequence of conveyances
and the order in which instruments are recorded. Most of the states'
laws share the same essential features, which take into account both
the order of recording and any notice a claimant may have had about
a prior, competing conveyance. North Carolina still retains a statute
that seems to make no exception to the recording requirements based
on such prior notice. The statute's express language can be mislead-
ing, however, because the courts and the legislature have recognized
or created many important exceptions to priorities shown on the pub-
lic record.
A. Recording Laws
Real estate recording laws have two main goals. The first goal is to
give those who acquire interests legitimately a means of protecting
against otherwise undetectable competing claims. The laws do this by
giving priority to interests that are first recorded publicly. The second
goal is to provide those interested in acquiring interests in real estate,
either by purchase or as security for a loan, a way to assess the validity
of the rights claimed by those with whom they are dealing.' The laws
do this by requiring real estate instruments to be recorded. To accom-
plish both of these goals, the recording laws must resolve conflicting
claims predictably and fairly.
Without a recording statute, if two grantees are conveyed the same
real estate, the first conveyance will be acknowledged as effective be-
cause the grantor had nothing left to give when the second convey-
ance was made. Only application of an overarching equitable
principle will alter this outcome. The recording laws can change the
result based on either or both of two factors: the sequence in which
the instruments of conveyance were recorded, and notice obtained by
means other than the records about a prior conflicting claim, usually
from actual knowledge about an unrecorded instrument.
1. See Bd. of Selectmen of Hanson v. Lindsay, 829 N.E.2d 1105, 1109-10 (Mass. 2005)
(discussing the "two interconnected" purposes of real estate recording of protecting purchasers
from undisclosed claims and giving them a means of detecting such claims).
2
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Recording laws take three forms: notice, race-notice, and race. Of
the three, the notice rules depend the least on the public records. A
typical notice statute provides that no instrument conveying real es-
tate will "be effectual to hold such lands against any person but the
grantor and his heirs, unless the deed or conveyance is acknowledged
and recorded."'2 This means that if an instrument of conveyance is
recorded, everyone else is deemed to have constructive notice of the
conveyance and to be bound by it. As with all recording systems, an
unrecorded instrument will not bind a subsequent purchaser or credi-
tor who does not otherwise know about it.3
Many states have "race-notice" recording laws. A common version
provides that real estate instruments become enforceable when re-
corded "as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith
without notice," but instruments are "void as to all creditors and sub-
sequent purchasers without notice whose deeds, mortgages or other
instruments are recorded prior to such instruments."'4 This type of
statute denies priority to a second grantee with actual notice about an
unrecorded prior conveyance, but requires that the second grantee re-
cord the instrument to be entitled to the statute's benefits.
North Carolina is one of the very few states with a "pure" race re-
cording statute. North Carolina's statute provides that no deed or
other instrument of conveyance "shall be valid to pass any property
interest as against lien creditors or purchasers for a valuable consider-
ation from the donor, bargainor or lessor but from the time of regis-
tration thereof in the county where the land lies."5 Notice plays no
role in this statute, only registration, which refers to the status of being
properly recorded (the word "recorded" is used in this article to refer
to an instrument's presence in the records, which may or may not be
deemed to be registration under the law).6 A familiar refrain in North
2. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 342 (1989).
3. See Hemingway v. Shatney, 568 A.2d 394, 396 (Vt. 1989) (describing Vermont's notice
statute).
4. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238 (2003).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18(a) (2005). The same language is used in different statutes for
deeds, id., security instruments, § 47-20, and easements, § 47-27. Louisiana, with its unique legal
system, is the other state with what is still described as a pure race recording statute. LA. Civ.
CODE ArN. § 3338 (West Supp. 2006).
6. North Carolina has a Torrens Act by which title to real estate can be confirmed by a
court decree and then ownership (not just the instrument) can be registered. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 43-1 to -64 (2005). The Torrens system was adopted by a number of states in the early twenti-
eth century but was unsuccessful. It was used mostly by holders of large tracts that wanted and
could afford to obtain title assurances from the government greater than the ordinary recording
system could provide. It never received widespread acceptance and has been displaced by title
insurance. See Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving American
Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 WHIIrER L. REV. 663 (2003) (comparing the recording and
Torrens systems and the private alternatives that evolved); Frederick B. McCall, The Torrens
System-After Thirty-Five Years, 10 N.C.L. REV. 329, 335 (1932) (stating in 1932 that "[tihe
2006]
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Carolina is that "no notice to the purchaser, . . . however full and
formal, will supply the place of registration."7 Ostensibly this means
that those who record first will have title even if they knew someone
else was already conveyed the same property. With notice and race-
notice laws, the second grantee's actual knowledge of the prior con-
veyance could result in subordination even though the second grantee
records first.
Many of the states' original recording laws were race-type statues
but were later modified to take notice into account.8 A number of
states have race-type statutes for mortgages but not for deeds.9
B. Registration Required
North Carolina's first laws required that deeds go before a court
before being recorded with the county register of deeds.1" This record
could then be used as evidence of ownership, 1 but the statutes did not
set rules about resolving competing claims based on actual notice of
an unregistered deed. Prior to 1885, an unregistered deed was consid-
ered to be a legal conveyance and courts looked to the situational
equities to determine whether someone who knew of a prior compet-
ing conveyance should be denied ownership despite being the first to
record.' 2 Actual notice was, therefore, as important as recording.
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that when a purchaser
knew someone else had a deed to the same real estate, "he is affected
with notice of every part of its contents.' 1 3 The court reasoned that
"an incomplete legal title" existed when the deed was delivered, which
could ripen into "a perfect legal title" upon registration retroactive to
the deed's delivery.14 The equitable merits of the first grantee's situa-
tion could be shown by parol evidence.' 5
In 1829, North Carolina began to strictly require a security instru-
ment, such as a deed of trust, to be registered first in order to have
priority as a lien on the real estate. 16 Without a registration require-
Torrens law is practically a dead letter so far as this state is concerned"). The continued exis-
tence of the Torrens law should be reconsidered in view of the burdens it continues to place on
registers despite its very limited utility, but that is a subject beyond the scope of this article.
7. Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 19 S.E. 99, 99 (1894) (quoting Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N.C.
358, 364 (1874)).
8. 14 Powell on Real Property § 82.02[1][c][i] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2005).
9. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-40-102 (2003).
10. 1715 N.C. Sess. Laws 38 § 5.
11. 1756 N.C. Sess. Laws 6 § 3.
12. See Ray v. Wilcoxon, 12 S.E. 443, 447 (N.C. 1890) (remanding title dispute "for an equi-
table adjustment of the rights of the parties").
13. Walker v. Coltraine, 41 N.C. 79, 82 (1849).
14. Phifer v Barnhart, 88 N.C. 333, 338 (1883).
15. Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N.C. 358, 363 (1874).
16. Act effective 1829, ch. 20, 1829 N.C. Sess. Laws 23.
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ment, creditors could withhold their instruments from public view.
This enabled debtors to obtain credit from other lenders who were
unaware of the prior credit. When the first lenders later registered
their mortgages, they would still take priority over the innocent sec-
ond lenders.17 The 1829 law provided that "[n]o deed of trust or mort-
gage... shall be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors
or purchasers, for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor
or mortgagor, but from the registration of such deed of trust or mort-
gage in the county where the land lieth . . . ."' The North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that this requirement "was intended to uproot
all secret liens, trusts, unregistered mortgages, etc., and under its force
it has been held that no notice, however full and formal, will supply
the place of registration."19
In 1885, the same rule was applied to deeds by a statute providing
that no deed "shall be valid to pass any property interest as against
lien creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the do-
nor, bargainor or lessor but from the time of registration thereof in
the county where the land lies."2 This law was known as Connor's
Act, named for the state senator and judiciary committee chair, Henry
Groves Connor, who sponsored it. That same year, Connor became a
superior court judge. Later he was speaker of the house, an associate
justice for the state supreme court for which he wrote important deci-
sions interpreting the statute, and a federal judge." Justice Connor
17. Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N.C. 283, 286 (1853).
18. Act effective 1829, ch. 20, 1829 N.C. Sess. Laws 23 (codified at Code of N.C. ch. 27,
§ 1254 (1883) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (2005)).
19. Hooker v. Nichols, 21 S.E. 207, 208 (N.C. 1895).
20. Connor's Act, ch. 147, sec. 5, 1885 N.C. Sess. Laws, 234 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47-18(a) (2005)). In 1943, the same race recording language was added to a statute specifically
applying to easements. Act effective 1943, ch. 750, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 47-27 (2005)).
21. Connor's Act was part of a political climate that sometimes employed the law as a tool
of exclusion, a goal that all legislators should now agree is illegitimate. Henry Groves Connor
was among the leading Southern Democrats who became known for advocating racial segrega-
tion in the late 1800s and early 1900s. While speaker of the house in North Carolina he was a
supporter of the infamous "Grandfather's Clause" amendment to the state's constitution. Edito-
rial Notes, Henry Groves Connor, 2 N.C.L. REV. 228, 229 (1924) ("Judge Connor was a real
leader in the famous legislature of 1899, which restored 'white supremacy' by the passage of the
constitutional amendment requiring an educational qualification for voting."). The 1900 amend-
ment limited voting rights to those who could read and write the state's constitution, except for
those who were able to vote in 1867 or their descendants, which was when only white people
could vote. Act Effective 1899, N.C. Sess. Laws 218; Act of 1900, N.C. Sess. Laws 2 (enacted at
N.C. Co sT. of 1868, art. VI, § 4 amended by N.C. CoNsT. art. VI (1971)). The Republican Party
platform opposing the Democrats in 1900 said that "the Democratic leaders have determined to
wage the coming campaign upon the race issue alone, and they go before the people with a
scheme of disfranchisement which is the most impudent assault upon the Constitution of the
United States, and the most shocking act of perfidy ever attempted by men who recognize the
obligation of an oath or the sanctity of a public pledge." Republican Party Platform 1900, re-
printed in HUGH T. LEFLER, NORTH CAROLINA HISTORY As TOLD BY CONTEMPORARIES 405,
5
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said that when the law was enacted, the state was "an inviting field for
the investment of capital in the development of its resources in mines,
lumber, water-power and agriculture, 22 but suffered from "the laxity
of our registration laws," by which the holder of an unrecorded deed
could obtain priority rights upon registration retroactive to the date of
the delivery of the deed.23 He noted that "frequent efforts were made
to place deeds in respect to registration as affecting purchasers and
creditors on the same footing with mortgages and deeds in trust," and
in 1885 the efforts succeeded. 4
Formal deed recording requirements must have encouraged real es-
tate investments, but they could not have been intended to promote
widespread real estate ownership by those who already occupied the
land. In 1885 there were many landholders who were unsuited to
comply with rigorous instrument preparation and recording require-
ments. They included former slaves, of whom there were more than
350,000 in North Carolina after the Civil War.2 ' A small, but not in-
significant, percentage of freed persons occupied land they believed
they owned. However, they encountered difficulties when arranging
for credit and meeting other demands of ownership, and they were
frequent victims of fraud.26 Another large group of vulnerable land-
holders were sharecroppers, tenants, and small farmers. Tenant farm-
ers operated more than one-third of North Carolina's farms.2 7
Connor's Act was obviously not intended to protect these groups who
were not likely to be familiar with methods of formalizing ownership,
and were also unlikely to have access to lawyers for assistance.2 8
The plight of disadvantaged landholders was not mentioned in the
public record when the need for the 1885 law was described, but Jus-
tice Connor did acknowledge that a strict registration requirement
was a "radical... change and departure from the law and policy which
405-06 (Hugh T. Lefler, ed., U.N.C. Press 1956). Although the state's recording law cannot fairly
be attributed primarily to white supremacy, the continued desirability of any law should be ex-
amined with some consideration of the context in which it was enacted.
22. Laton v. Crowell, 48 S.E. 767, 767 (1904).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. MILTON READY, THE TAR HEEL STATE: A HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 250 (U.S.C.
Press 2005).
26. See SHARON ANN HOLT, MAKING FREEDOM PAY: FREED PEOPLE WORKING FOR THEM-
SELVES, 1865 - 1900, 60 J.S. HIST. 229, 259 (1994) ("sometimes fraud in the drawing up or filing
of land deeds necessitated paying twice or thrice over for the same form").
27. HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER & ALBERT RAY NEWSOME, THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN
STATE: NORTH CAROLINA 522 (3d ed. 1973).
28. See generally, Avent v. Arrington, 10 S.E. 991, 996 (1890) (stating most landholders
would understand that a deed is important but few would appreciate the subtleties of preparing
and recording the deed including the rules for a proper acknowledgment of the signature, the
court saying that "only one educated in the law could be expected to understand that a seal was
necessary to make it, in reality, a deed, and vest the estate in the grantee").
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had prevailed for more than a century. '2 9 To spread the word about
the new requirements, the legislation required the secretary of state,
court clerks, and registers to publish notice about them.3 ° The legisla-
tion allowed a grace period for registering deeds, and an exception for
unregistered deeds executed prior to the statute's effective date if the
claimant or claimant's tenants had possession when the conflicting
deed was executed, or if the grantee of the conflicting deed had actual
or constructive notice of the prior, unregistered deed.3" Notice was
therefore relevant only to conveyances prior to 1885.32
For conveyances after 1885, application of the statute could have
harsh results, as illustrated by Grimes v. Guion,33 in which a woman
defended a claim of ownership based on possession and improvement
of the property. She alleged that the owner was facing foreclosure
and asked her to pay the taxes and make a loan. The defendant said
the owner invited her to take possession, to cultivate the land, and to
improve the structures. Further, the defendant said the owner prom-
ised that if she did not repay to the defendant all amounts expended
before the owner died, the defendant would own the property. The
defendant made investments as agreed but was not repaid. The
owner's heirs gave a recorded deed to someone whom the defendant
said was fully aware of her investment and claim. The defendant's
counsel described his client as "an ignorant colored woman, without
education. '34 The court was not moved by her situation and said:
Though the defense attempted to be set up by defendant portrays her
as the victim of a grievous wrong, which engenders indignation and
invokes sympathy, it states no cause of action against plaintiff. There
is no averment that he has either assumed, or broken any obligation to
her. Rather, the averments indicate that he has acted within the regis-
tration laws as written.35
Strict application of the registration law can also enable a purchaser
to invalidate interests that should have been obvious when the prop-
erty was acquired. In Rowe v. Walker,36 owners of land situated across
two counties challenged a farm road easement. The owners acquired
their land by a single deed describing the property in both counties.
But the deed that created the easement was recorded in only one of
the counties when the easement beneficiaries purchased their prop-
29. Laton, 48 S.E. at 768.
30. Connor's Act ch. 147, sec. 5, 1885 N.C. Sess. Laws, 234.
31. Id. at sec. 1, 233.
32. See Laton, 48 S.E. at 768.
33. 18 S.E.2d 170 (N.C. 1942).
34. Id. at 171.
35. Id. at 173.
36. 441 S.E.2d 156 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994), affd, 455 S.E.2d 160 (N.C. 1995).
2006]
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erty.37 A title search should have been done in both counties when
the land was purchased, and the easement instrument and its effect on
land in both counties should have been noticed. But the easement
recording statute states that no "easement of any character shall be
valid as against any creditor or purchaser for a valuable consideration
but from the registration thereof within the county where the land
affected thereby lies."38 A majority of the court of appeals said this
meant that registration in one county does not bind others with re-
spect to real estate in another county.39 The appellate court rejected
the trial court's ruling that the law "require[s] a purchaser for valuable
consideration to be an 'innocent purchaser.'" 4 ° A dissenting judge
found this to be an unacceptable result.41 Relying on terminology
loosely employed in two state supreme court cases,42 the dissent said
that the statute's qualification that registration applies to a "purchaser
for a valuable consideration" required that the party seeking the stat-
ute's benefits must have been acting in good faith, which included act-
ing without knowledge of the contested right.43 But a good faith
requirement is not part of the statutory language; its absence is a dis-
tinguishing feature of a pure race recording statute. The dissent's stat-
utory interpretation may have been creative but the motivation to
arrive at an equitable result was understandable.
C. Statutory Impurity
Contrary to the announced goals of a pure race recording statute,
there are many potential claims to real estate that are not shown by
the public records. Purchasers, title examiners, and title insurers must
investigate other records and other circumstances to be sure a real
estate title is what the owner represents it to be.
37. Id. at 157.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-27 (2005).
39. Rowe, 441 S.E.2d at 158.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 159 (John, J., dissenting).
42. For the good faith requirement the dissent gave the following authority: "Hill v. Pine-
lawn Memorial Park, 304 N.C. 159, 165, 282 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1981) (N.C. recording statutes 'do[ ]
not protect all purchasers, but only innocent purchasers for value') (emphasis added) (citations
omitted); see also Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 24, 31, 76 S.E. 505, 508 (1912) (purchaser without
notice of right or interest of third party, who pays full and fair price at time of purchase or before
notice, takes property free from right of third party 'because he is regarded as an innocent pur-
chaser .... It is a perfectly just rule, and it would be strange if the law were otherwise') (empha-
sis added)." Id. In Hill, the court recognized an exception to the registration requirement for
actual knowledge of pending litigation. 282 S.E.2d at 783. In Green, the court considered
whether a landowner was estopped from denying the public dedication of roads shown on the
subdivision plan. 76 S.E. at 506-09. These exceptions to the registration requirement are dis-
cussed infra in the text accompanying notes 62 and 65 to 68.
43. Rowe, 441 S.E.2d at 160-61.
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The recording laws apply to third parties.44 Failure to record is not
a defense against a grantee's enforcement of an instrument against its
grantor.45 Also, a deed obtained fraudulently,46 or without valuable
consideration, does not enjoy the statute's protection.47 These excep-
tions follow from the statutes' identification of "creditors or purchas-
ers for a valuable consideration" as those who are protected.48
The courts have made a number of important exceptions to record-
ing priority that are not reflected in any statute's text. An owner will
be held subject to rights described in an unrecorded instrument if the
unrecorded instrument is incorporated by reference into the owner's
deed or another recorded instrument in the chain of title. For exam-
ple, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that an owner was bound
by an agreement to recognize unrecorded leases because the agree-
ment was mentioned in the owner's deed.4 9 The court has reasoned
that someone acquiring title with such a reservation is either estopped
from denying its effect,50 or that the grantee takes the property in
trust subject to the conveyance to which reference was made.51
Parties' relative rights have been realigned based on other equitable
theories as well. For example, in Hice v. Hi-Mil, Inc.,52 a deed in-
cluded more property than the parties intended. One of two grantees
re-conveyed his interest to the other. The grantee with the entire in-
terest then transferred the property to a corporation the two had
formed.53 The corporation thereby acquired title to the erroneously
included land with no competing claim on the record. Based solely on
the recording laws, the corporation would have uncontested owner-
ship. But the North Carolina Supreme Court went beyond the stat-
44. See, e.g., Bowden v. Bowden, 141 S.E.2d 621, 627 (N.C. 1965) ("The registration of
deeds is primarily for the protection of purchasers for value and creditors; an unregistered deed
is good as between the parties and the fact that it is not registered does not affect the equities
between the parties.").
45. Patterson v. Bryant, 5 S.E.2d 849, 851 (N.C. 1939).
46. Twitty v. Cochran, 199 S.E. 29, 30 (N.C. 1938) (explaining that the statute did not give
priority to recorded deed over unrecorded deed when the former was "a voluntary one made for
a fraudulent purpose").
47. Paterson v. Bryant, 5 S.E.2d at 851 (holding that the first to record prevails "in the
absence of fraud or matters creating an estoppel").
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-18(a), -20, -27 (2005).
49. State Trust Co. v. Braznell 41 S.E.2d 744 (N.C. 1947).
50. Hardy v. Abdallah, 133 S.E.' 195 (N.C. 1926) (subordinating mortgage to subsequently
recorded mortgage mentioned as an exception to the warranty against encumbrances).
51. See Terry v. Brothers Inv. Co., 334 S.E.2d 469 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (subjecting deed to
lease identified in prior deed in chain of title); Bourne v. Lay & Co., 140 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. 1965)
(holding that rule did not apply to a reference to a prior lease with a disclaimer of any warranty
regarding its effect); Hardy v. Fryer, 139 S.E. 833 (N.C. 1927) (subordinating mortgage to subse-
quently recorded mortgage mentioned as an exception to the warranty against encumbrances in
a prior deed in the chain of title).
52. Hice v. Hi-Mil, Inc., 273 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. 1981).
53. Id. at 269-70.
2006]
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utes to avoid an inequitable result, ordering that the deed be reformed
because the individuals' knowledge was imputed to the corporation
and the corporation therefore was not "an innocent bona fide pur-
chaser for value" without notice.54 The recording law, however, says
nothing about a purchaser having to be innocent.
The courts also have avoided the law's potential for inequity by
wielding the sometimes omnipotent constructive trust concept. In
Arnette v. Morgan,55 for example, the court used a constructive trust
to address conflicts arising from a recorded deed that had omitted part
of the land intended to be conveyed. After the conveyance, a judg-
ment creditor recorded a lien against the grantor, who still had title to
the omitted land according to the public record. The court of appeals
held that the grantor held the property in a constructive trust for the
intended grantee's benefit, which made the recording law inapplicable
to consideration of the relative rights of the creditor and the intended
grantee. The court then insisted that the creditor must be "bona fide
purchaser for value without notice or someone occupying similar sta-
tus" to prevail, and because the creditor did not prove it was so quali-
fied, the deed was reformed to convey the property to the grantee free
of the creditor's lien.56
There are also circumstances in which third parties can acquire
rights in real estate without first recording an instrument. For exam-
ple, ownership rights to real estate can be acquired without a deed by
adverse possession based on open and continuous occupation to the
exclusion of others, without permission, for at least twenty years.
57
North Carolina shortens the required possession period to only seven
years when someone occupies the property under color of title,58
which can be based on a written instrument purporting to convey land
but failing to comply with formal requirements.59 The color of title
doctrine evolved to protect settlers who worked land relying on in-
54. Id. at 272.
55. Arnette v. Morgan, 363 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
56. Id. at 680.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (2005); Locklear v. Savage, 74 S.E. 347, 348 (N.C. 1912); see
generally PATRICK A. HETRICK & JAMES P. McLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW
IN NORTH CAROLINA, ch. 14 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing adverse possession in North Carolina).
For an excellent example of how adverse possession can overcome a registration problem, see
McClure v. Crow, 146 S.E. 713 (N.C 1929), in which the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
manded a case for a new trial on the question of rights by possible adverse possession after
determining that a deed's registration was invalid because it lacked a required witness
acknowledgment.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (2005); Price v. Tomrich Corp., 167 S.E.2d 766, 770 (N.C. 1969);
see generally Monica Kivel Kalo, The Doctrine of Color of Title in North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT.
L.J. 123 (1982) (discussing the doctrine of color of title).
59. See Price v. Tomrich Corp., 167 S.E. 2d 766, 770 (N.C. 1969) ("Color of title is generally
defined as a written instrument which purports to convey the land described therein but fails to
do so because of a want of title in the grantor or some defect in the mode of conveyance.").
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struments they mistakenly believed to have conveyed good title to
them,6' and survived adoption of the current recording statute.61
Another exception to the recording requirement is the enforceabil-
ity of easement rights based on a development plan. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has held that "a purchaser is bound to take notice
of an apparent easement, servitude, or dedication for a street or other
way [shown on a plan to which a deed refers or that is physically ap-
parent]; and if he fails to do so, he buys at his peril and takes his title
subject thereto., 62 This rule is applied when a subdivision plan shows
access roads for use of the lots within the subdivision, but the deeds
for the lots neglect to state expressly that these rights to the roads
were included. The courts do not allow the absence of a recorded
instrument to prevent purchasers from having access to the develop-
ment's clearly intended benefits.
A number of exceptions to the recording requirement have also
been created legislatively. One often contentious exception applies to
pending litigation. In some states, the only way for a litigant to ac-
quire rights in real estate in connection with litigation is to obtain a
court-ordered attachment and record the order in the real estate
records. 63 Consequently, even in a race-notice jurisdiction, a prospec-
tive purchaser or creditor can rely safely on the register's records for
information about litigation liens. In North Carolina, and in some
other states, such liens need not be recorded with the register. North
Carolina's pending litigation, or lis pendens lien, is indexed in the su-
perior court records, which binds later purchasers and creditors to the
outcome of the pending proceeding.64
The possible effects of litigation on real estate titles extend even
beyond rights that can be determined based on the superior court
records. In Lawing v. Jaynes,65 the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that purchasers and creditors acquiring real estate interests are
subject to judgments arising from litigation of which they had actual
knowledge.66 The court spoke of a purchaser's obligation "to show
that he is a purchaser for a valuable consideration and, when an action
is pending which affects the title to the property, that he had no actual
60. See Kalo, supra note 58, at 131-132 (discussing the origins of the color of title doctrine).
61. See Collins v. Davis, 43 S.E. 579, 581 (N.C. 1903) (discussing continued viability of the
color of title doctrine after adoption of the recording statute in 1885).
62. Green v. Miller, 76 S.E. 505, 509 (N.C. 1912) (but holding that there was insufficient
evidence of knowledge of the road dedication).
63. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:3 (1997); see Manchester Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Letendre, 164 A.2d 568, 572-73 (N.H. 1960) (discussing New Hampshire's attachment lien
procedure).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-118 (2005).
65. Lawing v. Jaynes, 206 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. 1974).
66. Id. at 171.
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notice of such action."67 Again, the state's recording laws were in-
tended to make actual notice irrelevant. But the state's supreme court
said that "[w]here a purchaser claims protection under our registra-
tion laws, he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is an innocent purchaser for value, i.e., that he paid
valuable consideration and that he had no actual notice, or construc-
tive notice by reason of lis pendens, of pending litigation affecting title
to the property."68
There are many other interests that can affect real estate that are
not required to be recorded with the register of deeds. A judgment
affecting real estate docketed in superior court will have priority over
any subsequently acquired security interest in the real estate. 69 North
Carolina statutes grant those who provide labor or materials for im-
provement of real estate a lien on the property, effective from the
date the labor or materials are first provided, which can be perfected
with an action in superior court until four months after the labor or
materials were last provided.7 ° A lien for municipal and county real
estate taxes attaches when the property is listed for taxes annually and
has priority over other liens.71 Federal environmental liens can be
created with a filing in the federal district court.72 Consequently, to
protect themselves, purchasers and creditors must examine court
records, tax records, and make inquiries about recent construction for
information not required to be recorded at the register of deeds.
A final example of how recording gives an incomplete picture of
real estate rights is the passage of title by will or intestate succession.
Competing claims based on inheritance are determined based on the
governing estate planning instruments and laws of succession. 73 Jus-
tice Connor, the sponsor of North Carolina's recording law, instructed
that the recording law "applies only to deeds, contracts to convey, and
leases of land. The statute is directed to the protection of creditors
and purchasers for value. The evil which [the statute] was intended to
remedy was the uncertainty of title to real estate caused by persons
withholding deeds, contracts, etc., based upon a valuable considera-
tion, from the public records. This evil could not exist in regard to
wills, as the devisee [is] not a purchaser for value, but [takes] as donee
or volunteer. ' 74 Consequently, those who examine real estate titles
67. Id.
68. Hill v. Pinelawn Memorial Park, Inc., 282 S.E.2d 779, 783 (N.C. 1981).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-234 (2005); Moore v. Jones, 36 S.E.2d 920, 922 (N.C. 1946).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-8, -10, -12.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-355, -356.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l) (2000).
73. Bowden v. Bowden, 141 S.E.2d 621, 627 (N.C. 1965).
74. Bell v. Crouch, 43 S.E. 911, 912 (N.C. 1903).
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often must look beyond the register's records to the probate records
or elsewhere.
This summary demonstrates that the state of the law on real estate
recording is not as simple as promised. In 1942, after half a century of
experience with the state's race recording rule, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court described the law in these glowing terms: "Its wisdom
has clearly demonstrated itself in the certainty and security of titles in
this State which the public has enjoyed since its enactment. It is nec-
essary in the progress of society, under modern conditions, that there
be one place where purchasers may look and find the status of title to
land."75 After another sixty years, those who rely on the records
know there is not "one place where purchasers may look" to make
such a discovery. Instead, there are other public offices, and other
circumstances, that must be examined and considered. It has become
an experts' system, and purchasers and creditors must rely on exper-
ienced title examiners and modern title assurance mechanisms for
protection against adverse liens and claims.
D. Statutory Clarity
Several years after North Carolina's race recording statute was en-
acted in 1885, Justice Clark described the law named after Justice
Conner as "[o]ne of the most beneficial laws enacted of late years."76
By making the public records a more reliable indication of ownership
rights, the law unquestionably improved the marketability of North
Carolina real estate in general. The goal of making the public records
a reliable determinant of real estate interests continues to have merit,
and may actually be more achievable today than it was in 1885. Real
estate conveyances and mortgage financing are much different in na-
ture and scale than they were a few decades ago. Real estate transfers
occur within a well-developed market, which involves professionals
and industries that are very familiar with real estate instruments, re-
cording requirements, and risks of mistakes. Modern secured mort-
gage financing, which did not begin in earnest until the 1930s, now
usually involves standardized instruments and practices. Those whose
rights depend on the public real estate records are therefore now
more likely to be protected under the recording rules and to have ac-
cess to professionals who are facile with the process. This includes the
vast majority of residential property purchasers, who obtain mortgage
financing through lenders who use title companies and attorneys to
protect their interests.
75. Turner v. Glenn, 18 S.E.2d 197, 200-01 (N.C. 1942).
76. Cowen v. Withrow, 17 S.E. 575, 576 (N.C. 1893) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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The information contained in the records is also becoming much
more accessible. Most registers of deeds now make at least part of
their records available to the public on the Internet, and recording
electronically with registers is becoming more prevalent. These devel-
opments mean that reliance on public records is less likely to displace
large groups of disadvantaged claimants as was the case when the race
recording laws were first enacted.
North Carolina's state motto is esse quam videri7 7 which means "to
be, rather than to seem." The state's recording laws are not what they
seem. If the race recording approach is to be retained, all who rely on
the statutes would benefit if the statutes are clarified to more accu-
rately reflect how rights in real estate are determined. For example,
the statutes could be amended to make explicit all exceptions to the
recording requirement.78 This would include mention of liens ob-
tained by lis pendens, tax and judgment liens, and liens for amounts
owed for materials and labor applied to the property, as well as rights
acquired by adverse possession. The resulting statutes may not be as
simple as they now appear, but they would be a more realistic depic-
tion of the law as it really is.
III. RECORDING, REGISTERING, AND REALITY
The rules for any real estate recording system must function to pro-
tect those who convey and acquire real estate interests in good faith.
In a race recording system, good faith purchasers and creditors must
rely on the rights accorded to them as a result of recording their in-
struments. North Carolina's historic process of subjecting instruments
to official review before they could be accepted for recording became
incompatible with modern transactional realities. At the same time,
the law can still be interpreted to deny the benefits of registration to
instruments that have not been properly processed before recording
or that contain apparent improprieties in the notary's acknowledg-
ment. These potential complications create significant risks for good
faith purchasers and creditors who rely on the laws to protect their
interests.
A. The Magic of Registration
North Carolina's recording laws protect only instruments that are
properly "registered." As interpreted by the courts, being recorded in
the register of deeds office does not by itself constitute registration
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 144-2 (2005).
78. For an example of such a straightforward acknowledgment of off-record interests, see
IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.41(2) (Supp. 2005) (noting that nothing in the statutory priority is in-
tended to abrogate the collection of property taxes).
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 [2006], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol28/iss2/4
N.C.'S REAL ESTATE RECORDING LAWS
sufficient to enjoy priority based on the statute. If the document is
not something that is permitted to be registered, its recordation has no
effect on subsequent purchasers and creditors. The North Carolina
Supreme Court once stated that an instrument "does not constitute
constructive notice, if it is not of a class which is authorized or re-
quired by law to be recorded."79 A document permitted to be regis-
tered also can be denied the benefits of the statute if it has not been
registered properly.
In North Carolina, as in other jurisdictions, the execution of deeds,
deeds of trust, and most other real estate instruments must be ac-
knowledged before a notary public or other authorized official before
the instruments can be recorded.80 This acknowledgment require-
ment prevents fraud by requiring instrument signatories to establish
their identities through the act of signing before public officials who
make a record of the event.
In most states, registers have little responsibility for reviewing docu-
ments submitted to them for recording. Typically, the law only re-
quires that registers review documents presented for recording for
basic indexing information and reproduction quality-not for legal
sufficiency or for compliance with acknowledgment form require-
ments.81 North Carolina is different. Until recently, officials reviewed
the content of instruments before they could be recorded. For exam-
ple, a register would not accept a deed with a notarial certificate in
which the notary's signature did not exactly match the notary's name
on the seal, or if the certificate was recited in the form of an oath
when no oath was required.
The North Carolina process is a remnant of eighteenth century law,
when those who wished to register their real estate ownership were
required to have their deeds "probated" by the clerk of the superior
court who was to determine whether the instruments had been "duly
acknowledged."8 " When the instruments were adjudged to have been
duly acknowledged and the certificates to be in due form, the instru-
ments were ordered by the court to be recorded by the register. In
79. Chandler v. Cameron, 47 S.E.2d 528, 531 (N.C. 1948) (recorded personal contract did
not give constructive notice) (citing 66 AM. JUR. 21, Records and Recording Laws § 107 (2005)).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-17 (2005) (deeds, contracts, and leases). Strictly speaking, an in-
strument presented for recording may either be "acknowledged" or "proved." Id. An "ac-
knowledgment" occurs when the signatory signs or acknowledges having signed before a notary
or other authorized official. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10B-3(1). A "proof" or "verification" occurs
when a witness to someone else's signature acknowledges the signature. Id. § 1OB-3(28). Either
involves a notary or other authorized official and a certificate recording the act.
81. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 478:4-a (1989) (amended in 2001) (register empowered to
insure suitable, permanent recording of documents submitted to them).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14 (1943) (amended by 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 639, § 1).
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1967, the burden of "probating" was shifted to the registers of deeds,83
and remained with them until 2005. Registers were statutorily di-
rected to register an instrument only after determining that all statu-
tory and locally adopted prerequisites for recording have been met.
In addition, until 2005 they were obliged to "pass on" the acknowledg-
ment that appeared on the instrument by determining whether it was
in "due form" and "duly proved or acknowledged," and, if so, they
placed a certification to that effect on the instrument and recorded
it.84 If the instrument was defective it was returned without being
recorded.
North Carolina registers' responsibilities also included an unusually
active role in handling records of real estate finance. In most states,
after a deed of trust or mortgage has been satisfied, the lender's repre-
sentative prepares a simple document and mails it to the register, who
records it. Until 2005, North Carolina registers were required by stat-
ute to examine satisfactions and their acknowledgments for complete-
ness, accuracy, and form compliance, and in many cases to make
entries on the recorded document about the satisfaction.85
Legislation that became effective on October 1, 2005,86 narrowed
the registers' obligation to review documents that are presented to
them for recording. They are no longer required to certify that an
instrument has been "duly" acknowledged or that the acknowledg-
ment is in "due form." Instead, registers review an instrument to see
if it "appears to have been proved or acknowledged before an officer
with the apparent authority to take proofs or acknowledgements, and
the said proof or acknowledgement includes the officer's signature,
commission expiration date, and official seal, if required."87 The 2005
legislation also simplified the process for mortgage lenders to make a
record of satisfaction of a deed of trust or mortgage. They can use
simple instruments prepared and signed by the trustee or secured
creditor and acknowledged, subject to the register's review only for
the presence of a signature and the basic acknowledgment elements. 88
These changes eliminated a safeguard on which many practitioners
relied in the recording process. The result is a system similar to other
states, in which the parties and their counsel are solely responsible for
the legal sufficiency of the instruments they record and make their
own determinations about the sufficiency of other recorded instru-
83. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 639, § 1, codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14(a) (2003) (amended
by 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 123, § 2).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14(a) (2003) (amended by 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 123, § 2).
85. Id. § 45-37 (amended by 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 123, §1).
86. 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 123, § 1.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14(a) (2005).
88. Id. §§ 45-36.10(b)(2), -36.20(e)(2).
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ments. But as the process is being changed to make it easier to record
without scrutiny, it becomes more likely that an instrument will be
recorded with a technical defect.
The limitation of the register's review occurred while form require-
ments for completing real estate instruments were made more com-
plex, which causes concern for those who rely on the records. There is
now a greater chance that a technically defective instrument will be
recorded. In 2005, the General Assembly repealed the existing notary
laws and enacted a new notary act. 89 The new notary laws are based
on the National Notary Association's model, which is intended to pro-
mote notaries as a safeguard against fraud, and which emphasizes rig-
orous attention to detail in the notarial process and completion of
certificates. 90 By enacting these laws, North Carolina elected not to
adopt a simpler Uniform Law on Notary Acts proposed by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws, now in
effect in twelve jurisdictions. The uniform law provides simple forms
and emphasizes the basic elements of an acknowledgment without in-
sisting on compliance with many details.91 As a result of the 2005 leg-
islation, the laws now require a notary's name to be typed or printed
legibly near the notary's signature; the notary seal must be within the
delineated dimensions and contain only specified information without
any of the graphics common in existing seals; and the seal must be
affixed to the same page as the notary's signature. 92 Each added re-
quirement raises another possible ground to challenge the legal effect
of an instrument without regard to the conveyance's legitimacy, and
official scrutiny will no longer protect purchasers or creditors from
failures to comply with the requirements.
Purchaser and creditors recording in other states need not be so
concerned about technical defects in the form of recorded instru-
ments. Other recording statutes do not deny recognition of recording
status based on such defects-recorded instruments that depict the es-
sence of the conveyance will at least be deemed to have given notice
of what they describe, which matters in notice and race-notice jurisdic-
tions. Those who represent purchasers and lenders therefore are ac-
customed to protecting their clients' rights by ensuring that
instruments are recorded even if they have minor defects. As a practi-
cal matter, any public record of an interest is likely to protect it, be-
89. 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 391.
90. See Model Notary Act (National Notary Association 2002), at http://www.nationalno-
tary.orgfUserlmages/ModelNotaryAct.pdf; Letter from Elaine F. Marshall, North Carolina
Secretary of State, to the North Carolina General Assembly (Mar. 16, 2005) (on file with author)
(describing proposed changes to the notary laws and the need for regulatory clarification).
91. Uniform Law on Notarial Acts (1982), 14 U.L.A. 201 (2005).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 10B-20(b)(2), -36(b), -37 (2005).
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cause good faith purchasers and creditors alerted to a possible adverse
claim will not proceed with an investment without first seeing that the
claim is resolved or making accommodations for the risks it poses. As
a result, the modern mantra in the national real estate community is
"just get it on the record." In North Carolina, the statutes and case
law continue to cause concern that an unintentional defect in form
could result in rejection of the instrument upon presentation for re-
cording or, even worse, denial of registration status sometime after
the instrument was recorded.
B. Recorded but Void
The requirements for recorded instruments have important implica-
tions for the reliability of the records as a depiction of legitimate inter-
ests in real estate. North Carolina's recording laws state that
instruments are entitled to protected priority status "from the time of
registration thereof."93 This does not suggest that something more
than recording is required. But the North Carolina Supreme Court
has consistently held that completion of the recording process is not
enough; an instrument is denied the benefits of the statute if it lacks
all required components of a proper registration. The following rule,
as stated by the supreme court, causes much concern among those
relying on the records:
Taking the acknowledgment or proof of a deed or admitting it to pro-
bate is a judicial or quasi judicial act, and, if the acknowledgment or
proof or probate is defective on its face, the registration of the instru-
ment imparts no constructive notice and the deed will be treated as if
unregistered.94
The question of whether a recorded instrument is entitled to the
benefits of the recording act is not unique to North Carolina. As one
commentator said in 1944 about the state of the law nationally,
"[h]undreds of cases could undoubtedly be cited containing state-
ments that 'invalid' or 'improperly' recorded instruments, without dis-
tinction between substantive and formal invalidity as records, are
'nullities."' 95 The principal justification for this rule has been that an
invalidly or improperly recorded instrument would not be allowed as
evidence by a court and therefore should not be entitled to be treated
as a valid instrument under the recording acts.96
93. Id. §§ 47-18(a), -20(a), -27.
94. McClure v. Crow, 146 S.E. 713, 714-15 (N.C. 1929); see also County Sav. Bank v.
Tolbert, 133 S.E. 558, 560 (N.C. 1926) ("a registration upon a defective probate is invalid and of
no effect as to creditors or subsequent purchasers for value").
95. Francis S. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, Part 1I, 93 U. PA.
L. REV. 259, 288 (1944) (emphasis omitted).
96. Id. at 295-96.
18
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 [2006], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol28/iss2/4
N.C.'S REAL ESTATE RECORDING LAWS
The notion that runs contrary to this view has been best described
as the obligation of "inquiry notice," by which someone who sees an
instrument is held to be obligated to make a reasonable inquiry into
any legitimate rights it describes.97 Such notice is likely to matter in
all but a pure race jurisdiction. The North Carolina courts have held,
however, that "no notice however full and formal as to the existence
of a prior deed can take the place of registration."98
The potential litigation outcome that causes concern about the re-
cording laws is exemplified in Barber v. Brunson.9 9 In Barber, a deed
of trust's registration was held to be void because, the court said, it
was "registered on a defective probate."1 °° The deed of trust was to
have been executed by three individuals. The notary's certificate was
in a form for spouses and was left with blank lines for their names and
for identification of the county in which the notary was commissioned
and in which the acknowledgment was taken.101 The court held the
recording to be invalid without explaining the significance of the omit-
ted information, or whose rights may have been affected by this defect
in form. Without this background, Barber is hard to reconcile with
cases such as Banks v. Shaw,102 in which the court refused to invali-
date a deed of trust that had an acknowledgment form for only a wife
when the instrument was signed by a husband and wife. In that case
the court stated: "It appears that the deed of trust was properly exe-
cuted and acknowledged. Hence the omission in the notary's certifi-
cate was a matter of proof. The certificate could be amended
subsequently to speak the truth, no rights of creditors or third parties
being invoked." 103 Notwithstanding this logical explanation, the out-
come of Barber causes concern as to whether an instrument will be
denied the effects of registration because it contains a format
irregularity.
There are reasons to believe that Barber was an anomaly. A consis-
tent theme in other cases in which an instrument's registration was
invalidated are issues with the instrument's legitimacy-not simply
with the form of acknowledgment or probate. For example, Allen v.
Burch10 4 involved a statute that enabled the plaintiff to record a deed
executed by a deceased person based on an affidavit that the "affiant
believes such deed to be a bona fide deed and executed by the grantor
97. See, e.g., id. at 259-73 (discussing inquiry notice).
98. McClure v. Crow, 146 S.E. 713, 714 (N.C. 1929).
99. Barber v. Brunson, 161 S.E. 549 (N.C. 1931).
100. Id. at 550.
101. Id. at 549.
102. Banks v. Shaw, 41 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 1947).
103. Id. at 281.
104. Allen v. Burch, 55 S.E. 354 (N.C. 1906).
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therein named."1 °5 The affidavit merely stated that the grantor and
witnesses were dead and that the affiant could not give proof of the
handwriting. Justice Connor, writing for the court, said the required
attestation of the deed's legitimacy was "the substance of the affida-
vit" and its absence could not be overlooked. 10 6
In a number of cases, the court held that deeds acknowledged or
probated before unauthorized officials were not entitled to protection
under the recording laws. In each, the instrument's legitimacy was
suspect. The circumstances have involved, for example, a deed pro-
bated by the grantee's heir and relative,1 °7 a conveyance for a corpo-
ration executed by an individual for whom there was no evidence of
corporate authority,10 8 acknowledgment by a notarial officer who was
a preferred creditor of the signatory,a0 9 and a clerk who probated his
own certificate.1' 0
A careful examination of the reported cases should dispel a convic-
tion that a court will invalidate an instrument's registration merely
because it contains a mistake in the form of a probate or acknowledg-
ment. The North Carolina Supreme Court once quoted the following
from a legal encyclopedia: "'courts uniformly give to certificates of
acknowledgement a liberal construction, in order to sustain them if
the substance be found, and the statute has been substantially ob-
served and followed. It is accordingly a rule of universal application
that a literal compliance with the statute is not to be required of a
certificate of acknowledgement, and that, if it substantially conforms
to the statutory provisions as to the material facts to be embodied
therein, it is sufficient." 111 The cases show that the courts' real con-
cern has been with instruments whose legitimacy is in doubt-not with
errors in the form of certificates describing the events. As the North
Carolina Supreme Court once asked, "Are the instruments to be ad-
judged void merely because probates are deficient in matters of form
and not of substance?" The court then answered that the proper con-
cern was about substance. 1 2
105. Id. at 355 (quoting Acts 1905, ch. 277, sec. 1981, 1905 Public Laws 323).
106. Id.
107. Scranton and N.C. Land & Lumber Co. v. Jennett, 37 S.E. 954 (N.C. 1901).
108. Bernhardt v. Brown, 29 S.E. 884 (N.C. 1898).
109. Long v. Crews, 18 S.E. 499 (N.C. 1893).
110. White v. Connelly, 11 S.E. 177 (N.C. 1890); see also Norman v. Ausbon, 138 S.E. 162
(N.C. 1927) (clerk could not probate instrument to which he was a party); Woodlief v. Woodlief,
135 S.E. 612 (N.C. 1926) (recorded deed that was not probated was not admissible as evidence);
Buchanan v. Hedden, 85 S.E. 417 (N.C. 1915) (invalidating deed that was signed by a power of
attorney that was not probated and that lacked a proper signature).
111. Freeman v. Morrison, 199 S.E. 12, 14 (N.C. 1938) (quoting 1 C.J. Acknowledgment, Sec.
183, p. 841).
112. Bailey v. Hassell, 115 S.E. 166, 169 (N.C. 1922)
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The courts' inclination to look beyond inconsequential matters of
form was made early on in Quinnerly v. Quinnerly,l a3 in which the
court refused to invalidate a mortgage just because an adjudication of
the acknowledgment was not in proper form. The court distinguished
between a situation in which "the probate was in fact insufficient," in
which case "the registration was invalid and of no effect," and a short-
coming in the manner in which the probate was depicted on the in-
strument." 4 The court stated "[t]he presumption is that it was
properly taken," and "[a]s the validity of the registration may be thus
impeached, so it may be supported by the same kind of evidence."' 15
In a number of other cases the North Carolina Supreme Court simi-
larly has looked beyond form to the substance of the alleged
impropriety. 116
The courts have also refused to allow a challenge to registration
based on alleged errors in formality not obvious on the face of the
instrument unless the party claiming the benefit of the defective ac-
knowledgment was aware of the disqualifying circumstance. 1 7 For
example, an acknowledgment by a South Carolina notary was taken in
North Carolina, where the notary had no authority, but the instru-
ment indicated that the acknowledgment occurred in South Carolina.
The court would not invalidate the instrument's registration unless the
party challenging it could prove that the grantee was aware of the
defect." 8 This rule makes sense; those who rely on recorded instru-
ments should have no obligation to investigate beyond the records to
113. 19 S.E. 99 (N.C. 1894).
114. Id. at 99.
115. Id.
116. See Consolidated Realty Corp. v. Henderson, 197 S.E. 144 (N.C. 1938) (obvious tran-
scription mistake in notarial certificate that indicated notary was from West Virginia rather than
North Carolina held not to invalidate the instrument); Roberts v. Saunders, 134 S.E. 451, 453
(N.C. 1926) ("[T]he mere fact that no seal appeared upon the records in the office of the register
of deeds is not conclusive as to whether or not a seal was actually affixed to said deed"); County
Sav. Bank v. Tolbert, 133 S.E. 558 (N.C. 1926) (finding certificate said it was completed in South
Carolina when it was actually in North Carolina; the court held the error was not patent and
therefore did not invalidate the registration); Mfrs. Fin. Co. v. Amazon Cotton Mills Co., 109
S.E. 67 (N.C. 1921) (holding that an instrument which was "subscribed and sworn to before" a
notary public was equivalent to its being acknowledged); Smith v. Ayden Lumber Co., 56 S.E.
555 (N.C. 1907) (holding omission of signatures by register's transcription did not invalidate
registration); Hatcher v. Hatcher, 37 S.E. 207 (N.C. 1900) (holding proper execution and ac-
knowledgment of a grantor's signature, in the absence of any acknowledgment on the instru-
ment, could be proved by testimony of the justice of the 'peace who performed the
acknowledgment); Matter of Hess, 407 S.E.2d 594, 595 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting a conten-
tion that an instrument was defective because its acknowledgment did not state that the affiant
personally and voluntarily acknowledged making it; the court said: "here is no requirement that
the acknowledgement itself contain any magical language to show that it was executed person-
ally and voluntarily by the affiant.").
117. Blanton v. Bostic, 35 S.E. 1035 (N.C. 1900).
118. Id. at 1036.
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determine whether something went awry in the instrument's prepara-
tion for recording. But allowing challenges to proceed if the error is
obvious invites opportunism. Someone who notices an invalidating
defect could acquire a competing interest expecting to be given prior-
ity because the already recorded instrument will be denied registra-
tion status. Such an unacceptable outcome could be avoided only if
the courts look beyond the recording statute and employ a construc-
tive trust or other equitable theory. This potential is yet another ex-
ample of how adherence to an oversimplified rule can have an
untoward result.
C. Statutory Rationality
Although continued emphasis on public records as the source of
title information has merit, especially as the records and their use be-
come more accessible, continuation of a rule in which a conveyance
can be subordinated based on a technical recording defect undercuts
the system's intended reliability. The recording laws are intended to
remove obstacles to marketability, not introduce new ones.
The possibility of technical invalidity unduly diverts attention away
from the substance of the transaction toward immaterial details. The
notary seal requirements enacted into law in 2005 are an excellent
example. On the day the law took effect, most notary seals in use
contained such things as small circles or dots that are prohibited under
a strict interpretation of the new requirements to the effect that they
allow only prescribed components on the seal image. Registers, who
must verify the presence of an "official seal" on deeds and deeds of
trust before accepting them for recording, were unsure about whether
they could accept instruments if they had such seals. A potential de-
bacle was averted when the North Carolina Department of the Secre-
tary of State, which regulates notaries, issued an e-mail stating that the
new seal requirements did not apply to seals obtained by notaries
before the legislation's effective date.119 Important real estate con-
veyances and finance were momentarily put in doubt by an unin-
tended effect of notary regulations.
The potential for recording invalidation based on technical flaws is
a remnant of a regime in which form was allowed to prevail over sub-
stance. In 1853, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
jected an attorney's argument that a recorded deed could not be
ignored because it "was spread upon the record, and for all useful
purposes had the same notoriety as if duly acknowledged or proven,
119. E-mail from Gayle Holder, Director Notary Public Section, North Carolina Department
of the Secretary of State, to NCARD Mailing List (December 1, 2005, 12:21 EST) (on file with
author).
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so that the objection is technical. ' 120 The court was not persuaded,
holding that "where a thing is not done in due form, it is not done at
all in contemplation of the law."' 21 Since then, the courts wisely have
not been so formalistic.
As discussed above,122 realistically courts are unlikely to invalidate
registration based on "technical or unsubstantial objections," but in-
struments remain subject to challenge due to the manner in which the
courts have sometimes described the statutes and the absence of any
legislative clarification. The possibility of invalidation due to a defect
in form is a serious impediment to the reliability that the race record-
ing law was intended to achieve. Over the years the General Assem-
bly has addressed technical objections only in piecemeal fashion. The
North Carolina statutes contain a number of curative provisions that
validate instruments with certain kinds of defects or that were pre-
pared during defined periods, many of which address the kinds of dis-
crepancies that have been held by the courts not to invalidate
instruments. 123 For example, the statutes validate instruments missing
a register's certificate before October 1, 2004,124 and validate ac-
knowledgments missing seals, names, and signatures prior to January1, 1991.125 The General Assembly's inclination to waive defects when
asked raises doubt about justification for leaving other instruments
with the same kinds of defects subject to challenge merely from lack
of similar attention. Technical noncompliance cannot be very impor-
tant if the legislature so willingly forgives it.
In Weston v. J.L. Roper Lumber Co., 126 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court noted the illogic of a rule that would invalidate a regis-
tration "where no substantial departure from legal requirements
appeared, but merely an irregularity which could be cured without in-
jury to the rights of others.' 1 27 The court also quoted from a United
States Supreme Court opinion that observed that some courts, "by
unnecessary strictness in their construction of the statutes, added to
the insecurity of titles, in a country where too many have acted on the
supposition that every one who can write is fit for a conveyancer. The
great evils likely to arise from a strict construction applied to the bona
fide conveyances of an age so careless of form have compelled Legis-
latures to quiet titles by confirmatory acts, in order to prevent the
120. DeCourcy v. Barr, 45 N.C. 181, 185 (1853).
121. Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-47 to -108.26 (2005).
124. Id. § 47-50.1.
125. Id. § 47-53, -54.
126. 75 S.E. 800 (1912).
127. Id. at 801.
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most gross injustice. ' '12 8 The concerns to which the Court referred
persist as shown by the continued appearance of curative acts.
Almost forty years ago, Professor James A. Webster, Jr.,' 2 9 a lead-
ing authority on North Carolina real estate law, argued for more
sweeping legislation to cure technical defects in acknowledgments.
He observed that "[a] rule that dictates that a perfectly executed, per-
fectly recorded instrument is incapable of giving either constructive or
actual notice under the recordation statutes, or which bars the admis-
sibility of such instrument as evidence in a lawsuit, has little to com-
mend it."' 3° He noted that "at the present time many defects of
record caused by faulty acknowledgments, probates, and recordations
are simply clogging the marketability of land."13' To cure acknowl-
edgment defects, he proposed a statutory provision declaring that duly
signed and recorded instruments are "valid and effective in law as if
each instrument has been correctly acknowledged" "notwithstanding
the instruments have not been acknowledged before an officer
authorised by the laws of North Carolina to take acknowledgments or
which have not been otherwise properly acknowledged, or the ac-
knowledgments of which have not been taken and certified in con-
formity with the laws of this State in force at the time each such
instrument was executed."'13 2 Professor's Webster's conclusions re-
main valid and his recommendation still deserves consideration.
Some other states' laws overcome technical invalidity in different
ways, all of which are viable alternatives for North Carolina. For ex-
ample, an Arkansas statute lists a number of irregularities that will not
affect an instrument's recording status, including specified missing or
incorrect acknowledgment certificate components.'33 Virginia limits
the time in which a document's legitimacy can be challenged, declar-
ing that all recorded instruments "shall be conclusively presumed to
be in proper form for recording after having been recorded for a pe-
riod of three years, except in cases of fraud."' 34 This gives affected
parties a limited time to challenge an instrument. Still, the fairness of
subjecting instruments to challenge on matters of form, even for a lim-
ited time, is questionable in a modern transactional environment.
A more comprehensive approach to avoiding some of the potential
irrational results from application of the recording laws would be to
128. Id. at 802 (quoting Webb v. Den, 58 U.S. 576, 577 (1854)).
129. Professor Webster was the original author of North Carolina's treatise on real estate
law, Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina, supra note 57.
130. James A. Webster, Jr., Toward Greater Marketability of Land Titles-Remedying the
Defective Acknowledgment Syndrome, 46 N.C.L. REV. 56, 70 (1967).
131. Id. at 68.
132. Id. at 69-70.
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-12-208 (2003).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-106.2 (Michie 2003).
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redefine the kind of notice for which a purchaser or creditor will be
held accountable. North Carolina could join the many other states
that have adopted a race-notice recording statute, the form of which is
described above.135 The choice would be the same as it was in 1885:
whether to emphasize registration with the hope of making the
records more reliable, or to emphasize protecting good faith purchas-
ers and creditors against those with actual notice of competing claims.
The answer may be different today than it was in 1885. A statute that
expressly acknowledges that purchasers and creditors will not be al-
lowed to ignore actual notice of another's claim would be a more ac-
curate depiction of the law than the statute currently provides, given
the numerous exceptions to the registration requirement and the
courts' willingness to consider actual notice when the equities
demand.
Other states have chosen a race-notice statute based on similar ex-
periences with race statutes.1 36 It is also the type of statute endorsed
in the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, the only modern
significant effort to unify state laws governing real estate instrument
recording.137 The uniform law was not adopted by any state and was
withdrawn by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws that
had drafted it. It was not withdrawn because of any substantive objec-
tions to the proposed recording rule approach, but for a number of
other reasons, including, according to some, opposition by real estate
attorneys to change, especially if it would diminish reliance on their
services. 38 Such concerns should not impede legislation that would
result in more coherent laws for those who depend on them.
A more limited approach would be for North Carolina to modify
the race recording statutes only to address the knowledge deemed to
be given by recording. The race recording laws are silent about no-
tice. They say only, in relevant part, that no conveyance is "valid to
pass any property interest as against lien creditors or purchasers for a
valuable consideration but from the time of registration thereof in the
county where the land lies."'139 The courts early on construed the stat-
ute to deny any notice effect to an instrument deemed not to be prop-
135. See supra text accompanying note 4.
136. Powell, supra note 8, § 82.02[1][c][i].
137. Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act §§ 3-201 to -205 (1976).
138. Ronald Benton Brown, Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land Transactions Act?, 20
NOVA L. REV. 1017 (1996).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-18(a), -20, -27 (2005) (respectively applying to: conveyances,
contracts, options, and leases; deeds of trust and other security interests; and easements). The
statutes also provide that to be validly registered a deed of trust or mortgage of real property or
a lease must be registered "in each county where any portion of the land lies in order to be
effective as to the land in that county." Id. §§ 47-20.1, -20.4. The notice issue discussed above
would not relieve a secured creditor from this obligation nor should it.
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erly registered, 140 an interpretation that the General Assembly could
address with legislation that reflects decades of experience with the
statute and the changes that have taken place in the transactional
environment.
Some states address the notice question by specifically defining the
notice effect of recording. For example, Illinois has a statute that pro-
vides that instruments "shall be deemed, from the time of being filed
for record, notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, though not
acknowledged or proven according to law; but the same shall not be
read as evidence, unless their execution be proved in a manner re-
quired by the rules of evidence applicable to such writings, so as to
supply the defects of such acknowledgement or proof."'' Although
the statute appropriately acknowledges the notice that recorded de-
fective instruments impart, the blanket declaration that any recorded
instrument gives notice to all cannot be given its plain meaning. Con-
structive or record notice is based on the assumption that someone
should be able to find the instruments that apply to particular real
estate. By necessity a search of the records must focus on convey-
ances to and from an owner during ownership; examiners cannot rea-
sonably be expected to search for every possible conveyance or
encumbrance recorded at any time involving every owner in the chain
of title.'42 For example, a searcher cannot fairly be held accountable
for failing to find an easement deed given by someone owning multi-
ple parcels over time if the easement was not recorded until decades
after the owner who gave the deed conveyed the subject property
away. The courts and commentators have recognized that "nothing is
notice unless reasonable inquiry must lead from it to the fact, appar-
ent to a reasonable purchaser, that there exists a hostile title earlier
and presumably superior to that which his vendor offers."' 4 3 The
North Carolina Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for this
qualification, holding that an instrument binds a purchaser only "if
enough is disclosed by the index to put a careful and prudent exam-
iner upon inquiry, and if upon such inquiry the instrument would be
found."' 4 4 Any statutory declaration that recording constitutes notice
and binds subsequent purchasers and creditors therefore should be
140. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
141. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31 (2001). For examples of similar ways to describe the notice
given by recording, see, e.g., KANS. STAT. ANN. § 58-2222 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5301.01(B)(1)(b) (Anderson 2004).
142. Francis S. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, Part 111, 93 U. PA.
L. REV. 391, 415 (1944) ("Search is only made against each name, from the day before the date
of the deed into him, to the day after the record of the deed out of him.").
143. Id. at 396 (emphasis omitted).
144. Dorman v. Goodman, 196 S.E. 352, 355 (N.C. 1938).
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limited to apply only to instruments that a reasonable searcher would
find. 145
Another approach to being explicit about notice of a recorded in-
strument would be to amend the statute to provide as follows, which
borrows some of Professor Webster's suggested curative language but
takes the next step:
Any party acquiring or conveying an interest in real property shall be
deemed to have record knowledge of any instrument on record at the
time of acquisition at the register of deeds in the county in which any
portion of such real property is situated, if reasonable inquiry would
lead to discovery of such instrument. Such record knowledge shall be
deemed to have been acquired notwithstanding that the registration of
any instrument, or form of acknowledgment or proof appearing
thereon, did not comply with the laws of this state for the registration
of real property instruments. Record knowledge shall be the same as
constructive knowledge as is deemed given by valid registration.
This would equate recording with constructive notice notwithstanding
problems of form that have no bearing on the instruments' legitimacy
or the equities of those affected. The result would be a recording law
that continues to require recording but that deems notice to have been
given by an instrument's appearance in the chain of title in the public
record.
IV. THE FRAUDULENT OR FRIVOLOUS LIEN PROBLEM
For decades, the records were protected by subjecting presented in-
struments to an official review before they could be recorded. That
kind of review became impossible in the modern transactional and
financing environment, as the volume and rapidity of real estate con-
veyances and financing dramatically increased, and legal instruments
took on more complex forms, often generated in others states or
countries. The modern environment demands that instruments be
more readily recordable.
The increased availability of information in modern society presents
an opportunity for those who wish to harm others through fraud, false
claims, and annoyance. The threat to the real estate records is a seri-
ous part of this development, because the potential impact of a fraud-
ulent or frivolous real estate filing can interfere with a transaction
involving substantial investments, or impair someone's capacity to ob-
tain credit. For example, some wrongdoers file instruments that claim
a "nonconsensual lien" against a targeted public official, which is de-
145. Wisconsin law addresses the chain of title issue by declaring that purchasers are not
bound by an instrument outside the chain of title unless a conveyance within the chain refers to
the instrument. Chain of title is then defined to include matters discoverable by a reasonable
search of the records and indexes. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 706.09(1)(b), 706.09(4) (West 2001).
20061
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picted as a claim to the official's property unless the public official
responded within a limited time. Although the frivolous nature of
these instruments is readily apparent, the instruments can nonetheless
cause harm to the target by holding up a transaction or impairing
credit while the instrument is investigated.
Since 2001, a North Carolina statute directs superior court clerks
not to accept claims of a lien on real property unless the claim is au-
thorized by statute. 46 The statute provides that an attempt to file
such a document is considered a misdemeanor offense.14 7 The statute
applies only to superior court records. The statutes do not require or
authorize registers to refuse to accept instruments even if they seem
intended for no purpose other than to harass. Registers cannot rea-
sonably be put in the position of having to scrutinize the validity of
complex instruments prepared by sophisticated legal counsel. Regis-
ters are elected officials with heavy responsibilities and limited re-
sources. The risk of loss to the parties from erroneous rejection of an
instrument, and the potential liability of the registers, are too great to
warrant putting registers in that gate-keeping role.
Those harmed by abuse of the recording system must therefore look
to civil or criminal laws for remedies. Current law is inadequate and
provides little deterrence against abuse. North Carolina recognizes a
cause of action for slander of title. Recovery for slander of title re-
quires proof of false statements about the title to property, malice,
and damages. 148  Such actions are rare in North Carolina. 149 The
cause of action typically is raised in connection with challenges to the
merits of litigation of which notice has been given. 151 Proving the ele-
ments for slander of title, especially malice, is difficult.' 5 '
Some states recently have enacted legislation to address the prob-
lem of frivolous or false liens or claims against real estate. Wyoming
law has the most comprehensive statute. It addresses a number of the
ramifications of frivolous filings by authorizing a damages award, at-
torneys' fees reimbursement, injunctive relief for a groundless or false
lien or claim, and by providing for an expedited hearing process. The
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12.1(a) (2005).
147. See id. § 44A-12.1(b).
148. Allen v. Duvall, 304 S.E.2d 789, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
149. Id.
150. See id. (finding only three cases in which slander of title was addressed prior to 1989:
Texas Co. v. Holton, 27 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1943) (holding comments about lease insufficient to
sustain cause of action); Cardon v. McConnell, 27 S.E. 109 (N.C. 1897) (cause of action rejected
because statement was truthful); McElwee v. Blackwell, 94 N.C. 261 (1886) (recognizing cause of
action exists for statements about trademark)).
151. For cases noting the proof of malice requirement, see Chatham Estates v. American
Nat'l Bank, 88 S.E. 783 (N.C. 1916); Quinn v. Quinn, 433 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Allen
v. Duvall, 304 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
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hearing provides a mechanism to invalidate any claim of lien against
government officials and employee based on their duties. The law
also makes use of such liens a criminal misdemeanor. 152 Other states
consider it a felony to file a forged, groundless, or false claim inten-
tionally;153 provide for a damages remedy and award of attorneys' fees
for filing a frivolous or false lien or claim;15 4 authorize multiple dam-
ages;155 or provide for different remedies based on whether the defen-
dant caused the instrument to be recorded or was merely named in
it.156 Some statutes simply declare claims of nonconsensual common
law liens to be invalid. 15
7
The currently available common law remedies offer little protection
against the potential harm that can be caused by fraudulent or frivo-
lous claims filed in the public records. The time and money it takes to
remove a wrongful lien cannot realistically be recovered adequately
with available common law remedies. An expedited hearing process,
enhanced damages, and criminal sanctions are all sensible tools for
preserving the system's integrity and for discouraging its abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1885, North Carolina's legislative leaders said they wanted re-
cording laws that made real estate more marketable by making the
public records a reliable single source of information about titles.
Since then, transactional realities and legislative initiative have dis-
proved the notion that the public record alone determines rights to
real estate. Lawmakers are justifiably cautious about changing well-
established legal rules on which important rights depend. If North
Carolina's race recording statute as applied were as pure as it was
envisioned, changing it could unsettle expectations and affect per-
ceived vested rights. However, the reality is different from the textual
simplicity. The North Carolina Supreme Court once said it would fo-
cus its review of real estate instruments "so that the essence of what
was done should not be sacrificed to the form of doing it."' 58 The
state's recording statutes are due for re-examination to ensure that
they coherently and clearly focus on this essence.
152. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-311 (2005). The summary review process allows the court ex
parte to order a hearing to occur as soon as fifteen days after a petition is filed by someone
challenging a lien, and the court may declare the lien invalid, and award damages, if the person
claiming the lien fails to appear. See id. § 29-1-311(b).
153. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.155 (1999).
154. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-35-109(3) (2004); IDAHO CODE § 45-1705 (Michie 2003).
155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-420 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-4 (2005).
156. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-420 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-1A-9 (Michie Supp. 2003).
157. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-1A-5 (Michie Supp. 2003).
158. Weston v. J.L. Lumber Co., 75 S.E. 800, 801 (N.C. 1912).
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